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Summary
In decision-making under uncertainty, economic stud-
ies emphasize the importance of risk in addition to
expected reward. Studies in neuroscience focus on
expected reward and learning rather than risk. We
combined functional imaging with a simple gambling
task to vary expected reward and risk simultaneously
and in an uncorrelated manner. Drawing on financial
decision theory, we modeled expected reward as
mathematical expectation of reward, and risk as re-
ward variance. Activations in dopaminoceptive struc-
tures correlated with both mathematical parameters.
These activations differentiated spatially and tempo-
rally. Temporally, the activation related to expected
reward was immediate, while the activation related to
risk was delayed. Analyses confirmed that our para-
digm minimized confounds from learning, motivation,
and salience. These results suggest that the primary
task of the dopaminergic system is to convey signals
of upcoming stochastic rewards, such as expected re-
ward and risk, beyond its role in learning, motivation,
and salience.
Introduction
When faced with decision-making in an uncertain world,
it is fundamental to evaluate both expected rewards and
risks. Higher expected rewards are usually preferred
over lower expected rewards. But sensitivity to risk is
also ubiquitous. For instance, when an investor has
the option of either opening a simple savings account
(low expected reward but a known outcome) or invest-
ing all of her money into a particular stock (higher ex-
pected reward but an uncertain outcome), she may pre-
fer the option with the lower expected reward because
of the higher risk of the alternative. Economic studies
(Bossaerts and Plott, 2004; Holt and Laury, 2002) have
confirmed that risk considerations, in addition to ex-
pected reward, indeed play a role in decision-making
under uncertainty and in the valuation of risky gambles.
This sensitivity to both expected reward and risk is not
unique to financial situations. It is also observed in non-
human primates facing uncertain rewards (Fiorillo et al.,
2003; McCoy et al., 2003) and in bees choosing among
different flowers (Real, 1991).
*Correspondence: kerstinp@caltech.eduIn neuroscience, evidence has accumulated that brain
activation correlates with expected reward. Human fMRI
studies have found that subcortical dopaminergic struc-
tures such as striatum are involved in reward-related
processes. Activity in these structures correlates with
reward value of a variety of stimuli, including primary
rewards, such as gustatory stimuli (Berns et al., 2001;
O’Doherty et al., 2002) and abstract stimuli, such as
money (Breiter et al., 2001; Elliott et al., 2000, 2003; Knut-
son et al., 2000, 2001, 2003). Studies of nonhuman pri-
mate conditioning document a monotonically increasing
relationship between phasic activity of midbrain dopa-
mine neurons and reward probability or expected re-
ward (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2005).
The correlations found between risk and activation in
cortical regions are unambiguous (McCoy et al., 2003;
Huettel et al., 2005, 2006). However, correlations found
between risk and activation in subcortical regions are
not. In the nonhuman primate brain, delayed firing of do-
paminergic neurons was positively correlated with risk
when risk was modulated by changing reward probabil-
ities (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2005). Correlation
was also positive in caudate neurons when risk was
modulated by manipulating problem complexity (stimu-
lus recognition uncertainty; Lauwereyns et al., 2002; Ta-
kikawa et al., 2002). For the human brain, however, the
findings are inconsistent. When risk was modulated by
altering the degree to which one knows the probability
of reward, i.e., when manipulating knowledge of the re-
ward probability rather than the probability itself, activity
in striatum correlated negatively with risk (Hsu et al.,
2005). In contrast, when risk concerned problem com-
plexity (categorization uncertainty; Grinband et al.,
2006), striatal activation correlated positively with risk.
Consequently, to date we are aware of no studies that
have examined whether and how subcortical dopamino-
ceptive regions in the human brain code for risk when
risk is modulated by changing reward probability. This
is the primary type of modulation for decision-making
under uncertainty, and it needs to be understood before
modulating knowledge of probabilities and studying
learning of probabilities.
Here we manipulated probabilities so that not only risk
changed over the full range, but also expected reward,
and in such a way that expected reward and risk varied
orthogonally. We then determined whether and how
activation in subcortical dopaminoceptive regions cor-
related with expected reward and risk.
In addition, our study addresses a number of impor-
tant open issues about the representation of expected
reward and risk in subcortical dopaminoceptive regions.
First, since neuroscientific studies have examined ex-
pected reward for a limited number of values, the pre-
cise representation, or mathematical model, of reward
expectation in the brain remains unknown. As financial
decision theory models reward expectation as mathe-
matical expectation of reward (Knutson et al., 2003), it
makes specific predictions regarding the form brain
activation must take to represent expected reward.
When reward is kept constant across rewarded trials,
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382Figure 1. Experimental Design
(A) On each trial, two cards were drawn (without replacement within each trial) from a deck of ten, numbered 1 through 10. Before seeing either
card, subjects first placed a $1 bet on one of two options, ‘‘second card higher’’ or ‘‘second card lower’’ (than first card shown). Subjects could
earn $1 if they guessed the right card and lost $1 if they were wrong. Once the bet was placed, subjects saw card 1, followedw7 s later by card 2.
At the end of each trial, subjects had to indicate whether they won or lost on this trial. A $0.25 penalty was imposed for misreporting, independent
of the outcome of the gamble. All times shown are with respect to the onset of the trial.
(B) Expected reward and risk as a function of the probability of reward. Expected reward, measured as mathematical expectation of reward,
increases linearly in the probability of reward p (dashed line). Expected reward is minimal at p = 0 and maximal at p = 1. Risk, measured as reward
variance, is an inversely quadratic function of probability that is minimal at p = 0 and p = 1 and maximal at p = 0.5 (solid line). As such, expected
reward and risk are orthogonal over the full range of probabilities, p in [0,1]. When subjects place their bet, the reward probability p is 0.5. After
display of card 1, the reward probability changes, depending on whether the subject bet that the second card is higher or lower, and depending
on the number on card 1. If the subject bet that the second card is going to be lower, then p increases linearly in the number on card 1; otherwise
p decreases linearly in the number on card 1.mathematical expectation of reward increases linearly in
the probability of reward. We therefore hypothesized
that brain activation increases linearly in reward proba-
bility if it is to reflect expected reward. To test this repre-
sentation hypothesis stemming from financial decision
theory, the probability of reward p needs to be varied
over all probabilities (ranging from p = 0 to p = 1) with
a sufficient number of intermediate values.
Second, the specific form of risk representation in the
brain is unknown. As with reward expectation, financial
decision theory suggests a specific metric for measur-
ing risk, namely, variance, the mean squared deviation
from the expected outcome (Markowitz, 1952). When
reward magnitude is kept constant across rewarded
trials, reward variance is quadratic in reward probability
p; variance attains a maximum at p = 0.5, and minimums
at the extremes, p = 0 andp = 1 (Figure 1B). Because var-
iance is monotonically increasing for p < 0.5 and mono-
tonically decreasing for p R 0.5, care has to be exer-
cised that p varies sufficiently to ensure that the
effects of changes in risk and expected reward can be
disentangled. Otherwise, an increase in risk may be con-
founded with a change in expected reward (Critchley
et al., 2001; Dreher et al., 2005; Knutson et al., 2003).
From a statistical point of view, variance and expected
reward become orthogonal if they are varied over thefull range of reward probabilities and are mean cor-
rected (i.e., after subtracting their average values).
Third, previous neuroscience studies have focused on
the learning aspect of reward anticipation (Hollerman
and Schultz, 1998; Mirenowicz and Schultz, 1994;
Romo and Schultz, 1990), leaving it unclear whether ac-
tivation related to reward expectation and risk in subcor-
tical structures requires learning and motivation (Knut-
son et al., 2001) to be present. Many of these studies
have been guided by Temporal Difference (TD) models
of learning (Sutton, 1988). In the case of risk encoding
in dopaminergic neurons, it too has been interpreted in
terms of reward learning (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler
et al., 2005). The controversy regarding the interpreta-
tion of subcortical dopaminergic activation is com-
pounded by studies that suggest that such activation
may represent salience (Zink et al., 2004) or nonspecific
forms of uncertainty (Aron et al., 2004; Berns et al.,
2001). Our hypothesis is that the primary task of the do-
paminergic system is to convey signals of upcoming
stochastic rewards, like expected reward and risk, while
learning, salience, and motivation constitute only sec-
ondary, albeit important, tasks. Testing this hypothesis
requires disassociating the signaling task from learning,
salience, and motivation, which requires a perceptual
experimental paradigm, unlike the previously employed
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is especially important because the correlation of sus-
tained activation of dopaminergic neurons with uncer-
tainty (Fiorillo et al., 2003) has been interpreted as the
effect of backpropagation of reward prediction errors
during learning (Fiorillo et al., 2005; Niv et al., 2005).
Finally, if a single brain system, the dopaminergic
system, is to represent two parameters (expected re-
ward and risk) of a single phenomenon (a gamble), the
issue of discrimination arises. Discrimination could be
achieved spatially, in which different regions could spe-
cialize in encoding the different parameters or distinct
neural populations within the same region of the brain
could encode different parameters. Another possibility
is that discrimination could be achieved temporally, in
which the same subregion sequentially encodes the
two parameters.
To test how subcortical dopaminergic structures en-
code these two parameters, it is necessary to utilize an
experimental design that allows for distinguishing these
alternative encoding strategies. Based on recent evi-
dence of activation of dopaminergic neurons in the non-
human primate brain when risk is modulated by varying
probability (Fiorillo et al., 2003), we expected to find an
early-onset activation in subcortical dopaminoceptive
regions that correlated positively with expected reward,
while a late-onset activation would correlate positively
with risk. We therefore allowed for sufficient time be-
tween stimulus and outcome and used a statistical anal-
ysis of the imaging data that is able to capture potential
temporal differentiation.
Nineteen subjects played a gamble where two cards
were drawn (without replacement within each trial)
from a deck of ten, numbered 1 through 10 (Figure 1A).
Before seeing either card, subjects first placed a $1 bet
on whether the first or the second card would be higher.
Once the bet was placed, subjects saw card 1, followed
w7 s later by card 2. We refer to the time interval between
display of card 1 and card 2 as the anticipatory period.
Upon display of card 1, the probability of winning
changes as a function of the number on card 1. For in-
stance, if the subject bet on ‘‘second card higher,’’ the
probability of winning is given by the number of cards
initially in the deck (always 10) minus the number dis-
played on the first card (C) and divided by the number
of cards remaining in the deck: p = (102C)/9.
Since a new deck was used on every trial, subjects
had no prior information about the outcome of the gam-
ble, so that on any given trial the initial probability of
winning at the time of bet was p = 0.5 with maximal
risk. As a result, gains and losses were independent of
the strategy the subject chose. In addition, there is no
role for learning, as any strategy is optimal. Following
the presentation of card 2, subjects were asked to report
whether they won or lost. In case of an incorrect re-
sponse subjects lost $0.25, independent of whether
their gamble had paid off. As such, motivation (the de-
gree to which one is willing to work to report whether
one won or lost) during the anticipation period should
not depend on expected reward or risk.
Reward level was kept constant across all rewarded
trials. Because of this, expected reward and risk (vari-
ance) upon display of card 1 change only as a function
of the probability of winning, as shown in Figure 1B.Altering the reward level would have potentially intro-
duced a confounding factor, namely, varying complex-
ity, which is known to induce activation in subcortical
dopaminoceptive structures in itself (Grinband et al.,
2006).
Results
In this section, we first report statistics on task perfor-
mance. Using a voxel-based analysis, we subsequently
document that subjects encoded the task as a reward
prediction problem by replicating previously found acti-
vation patterns for reward. We then focus on the antici-
patory period to find regions of interest (ROIs) whose
activity is modulated by expected reward and risk. We
determine how activity varies with the probability of re-
ward within the identified ROIs to verify that activations
correlate with mathematical expectation of reward and
reward variance. Finally, we report on tests to determine
whether the results were affected by learning, motiva-
tion, or salience.
Task Performance
Participants won on 48.60% 6 3.95% of all trials and
correctly reported the outcome of their bet on 97.8% 6
2.6% of all trials, showing that the gamble was indeed
random and subjects kept track of the cards displayed
on the screen.
Reward Activation
The contrast between wins and losses (i.e., the differ-
ence in activation following wins versus that following
losses) revealed significant activation (p < 0.0001) of a
subcortical network including caudate, globus pallidus,
thalamus, and putamen as well as midbrain and cingu-
late gyrus (see Table S1 in the Supplemental Data), in
agreement with previous reports (Delgado et al., 2000;
Elliott et al., 2003; Knutson et al., 2000, 2001, 2003).
The contrast between losses and wins, i.e., ‘‘negative re-
ward,’’ revealed no significant activation, which is also
supported by prior findings (Knutson et al., 2003). This
indicated that subjects were encoding the task as a
reward prediction problem and motivated our investiga-
tion of decision variables underlying this response.
Anticipatory Period Activation
Focusing on the anticipatory period, we first used
a model to define ROIs that correlate with expected
reward and risk (reward variance) during this period.
Based on nonhuman primate evidence that temporally
distinct responses of dopaminergic neurons might en-
code expected reward and risk respectively (Fiorillo
et al., 2003), we decomposed the anticipatory period
into (i) a response at the onset of card 1 (initial subpe-
riod), followed by (ii) a response until the onset of card
2 (subsequent subperiod). The duration of the initial re-
sponse (i) was set at only 1 s to allow for an onset of
the delayed response as early as 1 s after the stimulus.
The duration of the subsequent response (ii) was there-
fore longer (w6 s), in accordance with the finding in the
nonhuman primate brain of sustained neuronal firing
that correlates with risk. Because the total length of
the anticipatory period is only w7 s, whereas hemody-
namic responses typically peak at only about 4 s, we
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length of the respective responses, and hence, to differ-
entiate between phasic and sustained durations. We
therefore only focused on differentiation of the onset of
the signal: early [response (i)] versus later [response (ii)].
We next examined whether the activation we ob-
served conformed to the model of expected reward
and risk as specified in financial decision theory. We
tested the hypothesis that activation levels relate to re-
ward probability in the way that mathematical expecta-
tion of reward and reward variance relate to reward
probability (Figure 1B). We changed the specification
of our general linear model to compare activation levels
at different probabilities within the identified ROIs. To do
this, in the new model, one predictor for each individual
probability level replaces the predictors for expected
reward and risk in the old model.
Modulation of Anticipatory Period Activation
by Expected Reward
Over the initial subperiod (1 s) of the anticipatory period,
expected reward was highly correlated with activation
in putamen, ventral striatum, globus pallidus, anterior
cingulate cortex, midbrain, and other regions (Figure 2A;
Table S2). We also detected significant activation to ex-
pected reward during the subsequent subperiod (6 s) in
several foci in the cerebellum and medial temporal gy-
rus. Although our imaging sequence was not optimized
for frontal regions, we also found activation in medial
orbital gyrus and gyrus rectus (Table S3).
Based on our a priori hypothesis that subcortical
structures encoded expected reward as mathematical
Figure 2. Immediate Neural Correlates of Expected Reward
(A) Neural activations related to expected reward (immediate re-
sponse within 1 s of display of card 1). Bilateral activity in putamen
(L put, R put) and ventral striatum (L vst, R vst) correlates with the
probability of win, and hence, expected reward (random effects, p <
0.001). Neural responses are displayed in axial and coronal formats.
(B) Mean activations (parameter estimates b with standard error)
for ten probabilities. In both left and right ventral striatum (vst) and pu-
tamen (put) neural responses increase with increasing probability of
win. Dashed line indicates the best linear fit (L vst: r2 = 0.87,
p < 0.001; R vst: r2 = 0.66, p < 0.01; L put: r2 = 0.69, p < 0.01; R put:
r2 = 0.7, p < 0.01).
Error bars = SEM.expectation of reward, and hence, that activation in-
creased linearly in reward probability, we compared
the responses in ventral striatum and putamen for
each of the ten reward probabilities that arose as a result
of the number on card 1 (Figure 2B). Activation in bilat-
eral ventral striatum (L vst, R vst) and putamen (L put,
R put) showed a linear increase with increasing reward
probability; the best linear fit is highly significant and
explains a large proportion of the variance of the mean
activation levels (L vst: r2 = 0.87, p < 0.001; R vst: r2 =
0.66, p < 0.01; L put: r2 = 0.69, p < 0.01; R put: r2 = 0.7,
p < 0.01).
Modulation of Anticipatory Period Activation by Risk
During the second (6 s) subperiod of the anticipatory pe-
riod, risk was highly positively correlated with activation
in an area extending posterior to and bilateral from the
ventral striatum to the subthalamic nucleus as well as
mediodorsal thalamic nucleus, midbrain, and bilateral
anterior insula (Figure 3A). Risk was not significantly cor-
related over the initial (1 s) subperiod with activation in
any of the subcortical regions of interest except for mid-
brain. Instead, risk correlated significantly over this
subperiod with activation in the anterior insula and orbi-
tofrontal cortex (Table S4). As we are focusing on sub-
cortical structures, we do not elaborate here on the latter
finding.
Figure 3. Delayed Neural Correlates of Risk
(A) Neural activations related to risk (delayed response, after 1 s of
display of card 1 and until display of card 2). Brain regions whose ac-
tivity correlates with reward variance, reflecting risk (random effects,
p < 0.001), include left and right ventral striatum (L vst, R vst) extend-
ing into the subthalamic nucleus, midbrain (mb), and mediodorsal
thalamic nucleus (md).
(B) Mean activations (parameter estimates b with standard error) for
ten probabilities. Neural responses in regions displayed in (A) in-
crease toward medium probabilities and decrease toward low and
high probabilities. Dashed lines indicate best quadratic fit (L vst:
r2 = 0.89, p < 0.001; R vst: r2 = 0.88, p < 0.001; mb: r2 = 0.84, p <
0.001; md: r2 = 0.80, p < 0.001). Across all four regions, the quadratic
fit is significantly better than a model that predicts low activation at
p = 0,1 and high activation for ps 0,1 (p < 0.001; results for individual
brain regions:L vst:p < 0.01; R vst: p < 0.01; mb:p < 0.01; md:p = 0.01).
Red data points (asterisks) at p = 0.5 indicate late-onset activation
levels between the time of bet and card 1 when risk is maximal. Error
bars = SEM.
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Reward and Risk
(A to C) Immediate (within 1 s of display of
card 1) activations related to expected re-
ward (probability of win; red) and delayed
(after 1 s of display of card 1) activations re-
lated to risk (blue) superimposed on a mean
anatomical image. Activations are identical
to those shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3 but
are not pseudo-color-coded in this map. (A
and C) Spatial relationship between encoding
of expected reward and risk include overlap-
ping regions (displayed in purple) in ventral
striatum (vst) and spatially contiguous areas.
(D and E) Averaged adjusted time courses
showing different temporal patterns for rep-
resentations of expected reward and risk dur-
ing the anticipatory period (t = 0, 1, .7 s) in
the same subregion of left ventral striatum
(purple region in [A] and [C]). Separation of
time courses for low, medium, and high ex-
pected reward trials peaks early in the antic-
ipatory period. Separation of time courses
for low, medium, and high risk trials starts
later and peaks around the time card 2 is
shown. Gray bars indicate the presentation
of card 1 (t = 0 s) and card 2 (t = 7 s). Error
bars = SEM.To determine whether the risk-related activation over
the second (6 s) subperiod of the anticipatory period re-
flected reward variance, we used the same approach as
for expected reward and studied activation separately
for each of the ten different reward probability levels
(Figure 3B). If the activations reflected reward variance,
then their relationship with reward probability should be
quadratic, with maximum at p = 0.5, and minima at p =
0 and 1. We found that responses in ventral striatum (L
vst, R vst), midbrain (mb), and thalamic nucleus (th) are
indeed maximal at intermediate probabilities and mini-
mal at both minimal (p = 0) and maximal (p = 1) probabil-
ities. Furthermore, the responses in all four regions of
interest were shown to correlate with a function that is
inversely quadratic (inversely u-shaped) in the probabil-
ity of winning, with a maximum at p = 0.5; the best qua-
dratic fit is highly significant and explains a large propor-
tion of the variance of the mean activation levels (L vst:
r2 = 0.89, p < 0.001; R vst: r2 = 0.88, p < 0.001; mb: r2 =
0.84, p < 0.001; md: r2 = 0.80, p < 0.001). To ensure
that the close quadratic fit did not merely occur because
activation is low at p = 0 and 1 while high elsewhere, we
performed a standard nonnested hypothesis test (Da-
vidson and MacKinnon, 1981) that determined whether
a simple model with low activation at p = 0,1 and high
for ps 0,1 should be rejected in favor of the quadratic
model. Across the four brain regions, the quadratic fit
was found to be significantly better (p < 0.001; results
for individual brain regions: L vst: p < 0.01; R vst:
p < 0.01; mb: p < 0.01; md: p = 0.01).
Finally, if the encoding indeed reflects variance of re-
ward (risk as measured in financial decision theory), we
should be able to use activation levels during the antic-
ipatory period to successfully predict activation levels
after the bet but before display of card 1. At the time
of bet, the probability of win is p = 0.5, and risk is maxi-
mal (Figure 1B). Therefore, the activation level in ventral
striatum must be similar to the levels for p = 0.5 during
the anticipatory period. Figure 3B shows the level ofactivation in the same ROIs after the bet and before
card 1 is shown. This activation level falls into the confi-
dence interval of when reward variance is maximal.
Since the periods before card 1 and 2 are not identical
in length, the additional data points have to be evaluated
carefully. Nonetheless, they provide corroborating evi-
dence supporting the hypothesis that these ROIs reflect
reward variance.
Modulation of Anticipatory Period Activation
by Both Expected Reward and Risk
When simultaneously mapping the activation clusters
reported for expected reward (activation over the initial
1 s subperiod) and risk (activation over the subsequent
6 s subperiod), a region in left ventral striatum emerged
where the clusters overlap (Figures 4A–4C). We defined
this as a region of interest to determine how the different
levels of expected reward and risk were reflected in the
time courses. We compared average adjusted hemody-
namic responses to card 1 for low, medium, and high ex-
pected reward (Figure 4D), and low, medium, and high
levels of risk (reward variance; Figure 4E). Early during
the anticipatory period, the hemodynamic response
increased with the level of expected reward, whereas
starting from about 4 s after the onset of the anticipatory
period (when card 1 is displayed), the hemodynamic
response increased with the level of risk.
Testing for Absence of Learning, Motivation,
and Salience Confounds
As we were interested in determining whether there
were subcortical activations that were related to deci-
sion-making parameters independently of their previ-
ously documented role in reward prediction learning,
our task was designed so that learning would not im-
prove the potential outcome of the gamble. Nonethe-
less, it may be possible that learning-related signals
are generated during the task, particularly if the reward
prediction learning role of these structures is primary.
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aging data for evidence of learning, salience, and moti-
vation. We distinguished between switch and stay trials,
defining a switch trial as one in which a subject chooses
a different bet than in the previous trial; in a stay trial, the
subject chooses the same bet. For instance, if a subject
who chose ‘‘second card higher’’ on the previous trial
chooses ‘‘second card lower’’ in the current trial, then
the current trial is a switch trial.
Learning would imply that the likelihood of switching
increases after a loss trial, while the likelihood of staying
increases after a win trial. There was, however, no signif-
icant difference between the number of switches after
loss trials versus win trials or the number of stays follow-
ing win trials versus loss trials (Figure 5A). We do find
a (insignificant) tendency to stay rather than switch re-
gardless of outcome, which is consistent with previous
reports on the status quo bias in decision-making under
uncertainty (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; it should
be added, however, that in our paradigm the status quo
bias does not lead to inferior performance; any strategy
is optimal, as pointed out before).
Figure 5. Relationship between Subject Behavior and Outcome
History
(A) Histograms of choice behavior as a function of the outcome (win,
loss) in the previous trial. ‘‘Stay’’ refers to a trial where the subject
bets the same as in the previous trial; ‘‘Switch’’ refers to a trial where
the subject bets differently from the previous trial (if subject bet that
second card is higher in previous trial, then subject bids that second
card is lower in current trial, and vice versa). Evidence of learning
would emerge if subjects tend to switch more after a loss and
tend to stay after a win.
(B) Mean reaction time from trial start to placement of the bet as
a function of outcome (win, loss) in prior trial. Evidence of learning
would emerge if reaction times tend to be shorter after gains than
after losses.
(C) Mean reaction time from trial start to placement of the bet as
a function of difference in choice between current and previous trial
(switch, stay). Evidence of learning would emerge if reaction times
tend to be shorter for stays than for switches.
(D) Mean reaction times from display of card 2 to reporting of out-
come as a function of probability of reward as of display of card 1.
Evidence of motivation would emerge if mean reaction times de-
crease in reward probability. Evidence of salience would emerge if
mean reaction times are maximal for maximum risk (p = 0.5) and min-
imal for minimum risk (p = 0,1). Error bars = SEM.
See Table S6 for individual results.Learning would also imply that reaction times to plac-
ing the bet would be effected by previous outcomes. Re-
action times to placing the bet corroborate the absence
of learning effects: reaction times are approximately
equal whether the previous trial generated a win or a
loss (Figure 5B) and they do not differ significantly
across stay and switch trials (Figure 5C).
To determine whether learning could have caused the
reported activations in subcortical structures for ex-
pected reward and risk over the two subperiods of the
anticipatory period, we included a variable in our general
linear model that indicated whether the immediately pre-
ceding trial generated a loss or a gain. Under TD learning,
activation for expected reward should be significantly
correlated with this indicator variable (while activation
for risk could be explained as an effect of backpropaga-
tion of prediction errors [Fiorillo et al., 2005; Niv et al.,
2005]). We found no significant effect of prior-trial out-
come in the regions where activation was found to be
reflecting expected reward. The lack of an effect as pre-
dicted by TD learning indicates the absence of a learning
confound.
We also examined reaction times to determine
whether motivation or salience affected our results dur-
ing the anticipatory period (Figure 5D). One could legiti-
mately be concerned that higher expected reward
induces higher motivation, while higher risk induces
higher salience. The penalty for falsely reporting the out-
come after the anticipatory period is independent of the
outcome, while no reward is given to correct reporting of
the outcome. Since both expected reward and risk (re-
ward variance) are related to reward probability, we
verified the absence of motivational and salience con-
founds by plotting reaction times to outcome reporting
against reward probability. Figure 5D confirms that there
is indeed no relationship.
While the data presented in Figure 5 is pooled over all
subjects, the results reported also hold on an individual
subject basis (see also Table S6). Specifically, differences
in strategy (switch or stay) after wins versus losses are not
significant in 17 of 19 subjects (p > 0.05, not corrected for
multiple comparison). There are no significant differences
(p > 0.05) for any subject for reaction times after win ver-
sus loss trials and for switch versus stay trials. No signif-
icant linear or quadratic relationship between reaction
times and probability of win emerges for any subject.
Where applicable, we also tested for long-term effects
of learning and found no significant results. We see
a general trend of decreasing reaction time over time,
which does not affect the results reported in Figure 5.
Discussion
By utilizing a design in which expected reward and risk
as measured in financial decision theory varied orthogo-
nally and across the full range, we tested whether activa-
tion in human primary projection targets of midbrain do-
paminergic neurons significantly correlated with these
two critical decision-theoretic parameters. Further, the
paradigm was designed to minimize potential confounds
from learning, motivation, or salience, allowing us to de-
termine whether these target areas encode expected
reward and risk, the primary parameters of financial de-
cision theory, beyond their established role in learning.
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vation in ventral striatum and other subcortical dopami-
noceptive structures varied with expected reward,
whereas subsequent activation in ventral striatum var-
ied with risk. Activations correlating with expected re-
ward and risk were thus differentiated both spatially
and temporally and arose in the absence of learning,
motivation, or salience confounds.
Expected Reward Is Reflected in Linear
Response to Probability
The response of the ventral striatum and other subcorti-
cal structures is highly linear in reward probability. This
provides strong support that the phasic responses of
ventral striatum and putamen encode the expected
reward parameter of financial decision theory and as
such goes beyond the monotonicity of encoding ex-
pected reward shown in previous studies.
The interpretation of the early response as encoding
expected reward is also consistent with theoretical TD
models (Montague et al., 1996; Montague and Sejnow-
ski, 1994), which have primarily guided the investigation
of dopaminergic structures (Knutson et al., 2003), though
our results reveal that this signal is generated even in
the absence of learning.
Reward Variance, or Risk, Is Reflected in Quadratic
Response to Probability
The quadratic relationship between reward probability
and the late response in ventral striatum and other sub-
cortical structures supports the hypothesis that risk is
encoded as reward variance in the brain. Variance, how-
ever, is just one of several measures of uncertainty that
are all maximal at p = 0.5. Within neuroscience, entropy
(= minus the weighted sum of the logarithm of the prob-
abilities of each possible outcome) is the most common
measure of uncertainty and has been used extensively in
information-theoretic analysis of spike trains (Bialek and
Rieke, 1992). One interpretation based on nonhuman
primate electrophysiology in VTA has suggested that
the sustained response may be encoding entropy (Fio-
rillo et al., 2003), since entropy is also maximal at p =
0.5. Closer inspection of the data demonstrates, how-
ever, that the sustained firing of dopaminergic neurons
actually correlates with magnitude (Fiorillo et al., 2005).
As such, variance (which is sensitive to both probability
and magnitude), not entropy, is the right measure of risk.
This is consistent with financial decision theory. Finan-
cial decision theory sometimes uses additional risk met-
rics (skewness, kurtosis, etc.), but these appear to be
unnecessary to explain valuation when risk is as small
as it is in our experiments (Bossaerts and Plott, 2004).
Separation of Expected Reward and Risk through
Spatial and Temporal Differentiation
Though some subcortical regions are responsive exclu-
sively to either expected reward or risk, others are re-
sponsive to both parameters, raising the question of
how these signals are differentiated. Our results indicate
that the brain differentiates these signals temporally: the
initial response reflects expected reward; the subse-
quent response reflects risk. The distinct hemodynamic
responses to expected reward and reward variance in
human dopaminoceptive structures follow a patternconsistent with that found in nonhuman primate ventral
midbrain using electrophysiology, which report an im-
mediate, phasic encoding of expected reward and a
late-onset, sustained encoding of risk (Fiorillo et al.,
2003). The late onset happened to be too late relative
to the duration of the anticipation period, however, to
discriminate between phasic and sustained responses
as well as one has been able to do in electrophysiologi-
cal studies. Our results suggest that the downstream ef-
fects of temporally differentiated activation in the ventral
midbrain result in both an early onset separation of sig-
nals correlating with expected reward and a late onset
separation of signals correlating with risk in the target
(dopaminoceptive) structures.
It is interesting to note that, with the exception of the
midbrain, we failed to find an immediate activation in
subcortical structures that correlated with risk. Activa-
tion in subcortical dopaminoceptive areas that corre-
lated with risk is invariably delayed. This raises a number
of issues worth investigating in future research. Is there
an immediate signal for risk elsewhere in the brain (our
data suggest that insula may play a role)? If so, how
are the signals of expected reward and risk combined
in order to guide decisions? What is the role of the de-
layed risk signal in subcortical dopaminoceptive areas?
Is it used to improve learning, as suggested by Tobler
et al. (2005)? Interestingly, the late-onset activity in ven-
tral striatum looks similar to delayed activity in parietal
cortex reported by Huettel et al. (2005, 2006).
Brain Activation Decomposes along Basic Financial
Parameters of Monetary Gambles
Our investigation was guided by the mathematical model
of decision-making under uncertainty stemming from fi-
nancial decision theory. This model specifies the minimal
parameters that are necessary for rational choice under
uncertainty (expectation and variance of reward). Our
study shows that brain activity correlates with these
two parameters. In financial decision theory, expectation
is balanced against variance, and this trade-off has led to
important insights not only about simple animal behavior
(e.g., bee foraging [Real, 1991]), but also about complex
human activity, such as the demand for money and its re-
lation to yields on fixed-income securities (Tobin, 1958),
or the demand for and pricing of multiple risky securities.
For instance, Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin
(1966) demonstrated that expected returns on risky se-
curities should increase not as a function of their own
risk (variance), but only to the extent that they contribute
to the risk (variance) of the securities market as a whole.
Experiments confirm these predictions (Bossaerts and
Plott, 2004). Later, Black and Scholes (1973) showed
that prices of options (to purchase or sell securities) in-
crease as a function of risk—again measured by vari-
ance. It is striking that brain activation at the level of sub-
cortical dopaminergic structures reflects the separation
of expected reward and risk on which financial decision
theory is based.
Objective Perception Independent of Choice,
Learning, and Attention
As our results are obtained under purely perceptual con-
ditions, i.e. when no choice is to be made subsequently,
the activations we report are related primarily to the
Neuron
388assessment of risk and reward in gambles. Many levels
of processing intervene between perception and choice,
so it is possible that the brain tracks expected reward
and risk at the perceptual level, while additional ele-
ments, such as contextual factors (e.g., decisions by
others [Abel, 1990]), modulate choice. As such, percep-
tion of reward and risk may continue even if choice is not
affected (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005). Absent subse-
quent choice, brain activity may merely reflect informa-
tion gathering for the case that a choice opportunity
would suddenly and unexpectedly arise.
It is important to point out that our goal was to investi-
gate the perception of risk and reward and whether such
perception conformed to a specific mathematical model.
Our finding that at the perceptual level the brain con-
forms to this model is entirely consistent with the fact
that there may also be subjective representations of
decision-making parameters that vary from this model,
as they may simply be different levels of representation
and/or generated under different contexts. It is important
for future research to investigate when and where sub-
jective representations of these parameters may also
be generated and how these signals may be integrated
or interact in the generation of choice behavior.
Likewise, our task does not involve conditioning. Be-
havioral data support the absence of conditioning, and
statistical analysis of brain activity confirms the absence
of conditioning confounds. Conditioning paradigms al-
low one to shed light on factors such as learning, moti-
vation, or salience, in addition to perception (Critchley
et al., 2001; Elliott et al., 2003; Ernst et al., 2004; Knutson
et al., 2003; Rustichini et al., 2005; Zink et al., 2004). Here
we show how expected reward and risk correlate with
activation in subcortical dopaminoceptive structures
when these additional elements are removed.
Implications for Pathological Decision-Making
under Risk
Pathological behaviors ranging from addiction to gam-
bling (Bechara et al., 1997), as well as a variety of mental
illnesses such as bipolar disorder (Minassian et al.,
2004) and schizophrenia (Shurman et al., 2005), are par-
tially characterized by risk taking. To date, it is unknown
whether such pathological decision-making under risk
is due to misperception of risk or disruptions in cognitive
processes, such as learning, planning, and choice. For
example, a bipolar subject during a manic episode
may invest in a risky business proposition either be-
cause they misperceive the risk to be lower than it actu-
ally is, or because they accurately perceive the risk to be
high but may have impaired learning, attentional, work-
ing memory, or choice processes. To date, studies of
pathological decision-making under risk have primarily
utilized the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) (Cavedini et al.,
2002; Clark et al., 2001; Shurman et al., 2005), which
was designed to assess sensitivity to future negative re-
inforcers (Bechara et al., 1997). Recent studies (Dunn
et al., 2006; Maia and McClelland, 2004), however, sug-
gest that impaired performance on the IGT may be due
to impairments in reversal learning, working memory,
attentional shift, and related high-level cognitive pro-
cesses rather than misperceptions of risk per se. Since
our task was designed to minimize the involvement of
these high-level processes, in the future it may beutilized with clinical populations to determine whether
alterations in risk perception accompany their changes
in risky behavior. This may lead to a better understand-
ing of the relative contributions of risk misperception
versus cognitive impairments in these pathological
cases, may suggest different treatment approaches,
and may also gauge the impact on and the feedback
from higher-level brain regions known to contribute to
decision-making (e.g., ventro-medial prefrontal cortex
[Fukui et al., 2005]).
Conclusion
In neuroscience, the investigation of the dopaminergic
system in tasks involving uncertainty has emphasized
reward prediction learning. Risk perception has been
less well studied, yet it is central to decision-making un-
der uncertainty, as formalized in financial decision the-
ory. Our results show that brain activity in subcortical
dopaminoceptive regions of the human brain can be
separated, both spatially and temporally, into signals
that correlate with (mathematical) expectation of reward
and with reward variance (risk)—two fundamental pa-
rameters of financial decision theory. The role of human
subcortical dopaminoceptive structures in reward-re-
lated processing is extended even further as our results
suggest that these structures convey signals of upcom-
ing stochastic rewards, like expected reward and risk,
beyond these structures’ role in learning, salience and
motivation.
Experimental Procedures
A total of 19 subjects participated in the study (ten male, nine female;
aged 18–30, mean age 21.4 years). All subjects gave full informed
consent to participate in the study. The study was approved by
the California Institute of Technology Institutional Review Board.
Experimental Paradigm
Each subject was given written instructions for the game and com-
pleted a brief training session outside the magnet. During scanning,
trials were randomly ordered. For each session, subjects were pro-
vided with an initial endowment of $25. If no bet was placed, they
lost automatically. They also lost $0.25 if they incorrectly reported
the outcome of their bet or if they did not respond. Accumulated
gains were shown only at the end of each session. Subjects played
three sessions with 30 trials per session. At the end of the experi-
ment, subjects selected one of the three sessions at random, which
determined their final payoff.
fMRI Acquisition
Each scanning session included a localizer scan and T1-weighted
MPRAGE anatomical scans (256 3 256 matrix, 176 1 mm sagittal
slices) followed by the acquisition of functional images while sub-
jects performed the gambling task. Images were acquired using
a Siemens TRIO 3.0T full body MRI scanner using T2*-weighted
PACE EPI (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, 64 3 64, 3.28125 3 3.28125
mm2, 32 3.0 mm slices, no gap, field of view = 210). For each subject,
three functional runs were collected (392–400 scans each).
Data Processing and Analysis
Data were processed and analyzed using BrainVoyager v1.26. Pre-
processing included motion correction (six-parameter rigid body
transformation), slice timing correction, linear drift removal, high-
pass filtering, normalization to Talairach space, and spatial smooth-
ing with a full width at half-maximum Gaussian kernel of 8 mm. For
each subject, a separate linear model was constructed that included
the regressors described below as well as visual and motor activa-
tion. Regressors modeled the BOLD response to the specified
events using a convolution kernel applied to a boxcar function.
Neural Differentiation of Expected Reward and Risk
389A first-order autoregressive model was used to correct for temporal
autocorrelations. For each subject, contrasts were calculated at
every voxel in the brain. In a random-effects analysis, a one-sample
t test determined where the average contrast value for the group as
a whole (n = 19 subjects) differed significantly from zero. Statistical
maps were thresholded for significance (p < 0.001) and cluster size
(R5 voxels). The model used to identify regions of interests decom-
posed the anticipatory period into two consecutive epochs: a short
epoch (1 s from card 1) followed by a long epoch (6 s) modeling the
remainder of the anticipatory period until card 2. Both epochs were
modeled with three predictors, a 0th, 1st, and 2nd order term. The pre-
dictor for the 0th order term modeled the anticipatory period. The 1st
and 2nd order terms modeled the same period, but predicted a he-
modynamic response that scaled linearly and quadratically with
the probability of win. Note that all three components were orthog-
onal with respect to one another. The model also included predictors
for visual and motor activation as well as for wins and losses at the
time of card 2. To compare activation levels at different probabilities
(b estimates in Figures 2 and 3) within the identified regions of inter-
est, the model was modified to include one predictor for each indi-
vidual probability instead of the 0th, 1st, and 2nd order terms. For de-
termining risk activation levels, a late-onset predictor between the
bet and card 1 was also included to model the (maximal) risk at
that time. Adjusted time courses (Figures 4D and 4E) are time
courses corrected for the effects (confounds) in the reduced model
(for probability time course, reduced model = full model2 predictor
for 1st order term [probability]; for risk time course, reduced model =
full model2 predictor for 2nd order term [risk]). This ensured that the
effects shown were orthogonal to all effects captured by the re-
duced model. Any effect not included in the reduced model would
show up in the adjusted data (error term), while any effect included
in the reduced model should not show up. For the probability time
course, adjusted data were grouped into low (p < 0.3), medium
(0.3 < p < 0.7), and high (p > 0.7) probability trials, averaged over
all trials (time-locked to card 1). This event-related average was plot-
ted over time for each group. For the risk time course, adjusted data
were grouped into low (p = 0 or p = 1), medium (0 < p < 0.3 or 0.7 < p <
1), and high (0.3 < p < 0.7) risk trials, averaged over all trials (time-
locked to card 1). This event-related average of residuals was plot-
ted over time for each group.
Supplemental Data
The Supplemental Data for this article can be found online at http://
www.neuron.org/cgi/content/full/51/3/381/DC1/.
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